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Abstract—Many distributed systems are subject to the Sybil
attack, where an adversary subverts system operation by emu-
lating behavior of multiple distinct nodes. Most recent work to
address this problem leverages social networks to establish trust
relationships between users. However, the use of social networks
is not appropriate in all systems, as they can be subverted by
social engineering techniques, require nodes in a P2P network
to maintain and be aware of social network information, and
may require overly optimistic assumptions about the fast-mixing
nature of social links.
This paper explores an alternate approach. We present
SybilControl, a novel, decentralized scheme for controlling the
extent of Sybil attacks. SybilControl is an admission control
mechanism for nodes in a distributed system that requires
them to periodically solve computational puzzles. SybilControl
consists of a distributed protocol to allow nodes to collectively
verify the computational work of other nodes, and mechanisms
to prevent the malicious influence of misbehaving nodes that
do not perform the computational work. We investigate the
practical issues involved with deploying SybilControl into existing
DHTs, particularly with resilient lookup protocols. We evaluate
SybilControl through simulations and find that SybilControl
retains low overhead and latency. Additionally, even when the
adversary controls 20% of the system’s computational resources,
SybilControl-enabled DHTs can be configured to maintain lookup
performance at over 99% success rate using low communication
overhead.
Keywords-Sybil attack, distributed systems, computational puz-
zles
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized distributed systems, such as peer-to-peer net-
works, are particularly susceptible to the Sybil attack [8]. In
this attack, an adversary exploits the low cost-of-entry into a
system by obtaining multiple identities, thus taking the guise
of many distinct nodes. These Sybil nodes can then collude to
launch further attacks, for example by taking over resources
and disrupting connectivity, to subvert the system’s operation.
Researchers have documented this vulnerability in real-world
systems, including the Maze P2P file-sharing system [12], [20]
and Vanish [9], [19], a system for self-destructing data that
relies on a distributed hash table (DHT).
To address this problem, recent research has focused on
leveraging information from social networks to protect hon-
est users, resulting in several state-of-the-art decentralized
approaches [6], [11], [21], [22]. The key observation behind
these works is that it is expensive for a malicious adversary
to establish social links with honest users, and hence social
network graphs can be used to detect and mitigate Sybil
attacks.
However, the reliance of these techniques on social networks
has disadvantages. The use of a social network is not appropri-
ate in many systems, as social relationships require P2P nodes
to be aware of their social contacts and users to exert manual
effort to set up and maintain accurate relationships. Also, so-
cial network-based approaches operate on the assumption that
the number of connections between Sybil nodes and honest
nodes in the network is small relative to the number of honest
nodes. However, recent studies [1], [3], [18] indicate social
networks are prone to social engineering attacks (for example,
some Facebook users agree to all friend requests regardless
of whether the other party is known to them). Furthermore,
these defenses often require the social networks to be fast-
mixing, meaning a random walk on the graph approaches
the stationary distribution relatively quickly. However, recent
investigations [13] into the mixing times of real-world social
networks have found that they may not be as fast as what the
approaches assumed. These disadvantages lead to questions
about the practicality of social network methods in real-world
contexts.
To address this, we propose SybilControl, a novel, decen-
tralized Sybil defense scheme. Inspired by the conceptual
work of Borisov [2], SybilControl goes beyond the theory
and is the first practical, decentralized scheme to mitigate
Sybil attacks that does not require the use of social networks.
It is based on the insight that if an adversary with finite
resources must dedicate some resources to support each node
in a system, then it can only support a limited number of
adversarial nodes. SybilControl enforces that nodes dedicate
computational resources to support their system identities.
This enforcement is conducted through two main components:
a distributed protocol to allow nodes to collectively verify
computational work of other nodes, and defense mechanisms
that protect honest nodes from the influences of misbehaving
nodes that do not perform computational work.
In particular, a SybilControl-enabled node can distribute
challenges to its neighbors, and can verify that those neighbors
recently used the challenges to solve computational puzzles,
which require significant amounts of computation to solve
but are easy to verify. Challenges are propagated throughout
the network in a scalable fashion using aggregation, enabling
nodes to verify other nodes that are not their adjacent neigh-
bors. To provide the property that the number of identifiers
owned by a user remains commensurate with the computa-
tional power of the user, SybilControl nodes periodically re-
issue fresh challenges, forcing other nodes to periodically
solve new puzzles to remain in the system. Defense mecha-
nisms protect honest nodes from Sybils that do not perform
computational work, preventing those Sybils from subverting
the system. To reduce overheads, SybilControl can operate
over sessions already maintained by the underlying system to
be secured (e.g., finger and successor relationships in DHTs).
While SybilControl can be applied to a wide variety of
distributed systems, to grapple with practical issues, we deploy
it in the context of the Chord DHT [17]. We evaluate a
SybilControl-enabled instance of Chord through simulations,
and find that it introduces minimal communication overheads
while retaining the low-latency forwarding properties of Chord.
Additionally, it can remain robust even when the adversary con-
trols 20% of the system’s computational resources, maintain-
ing a lookup success rate above 99% with low communication
overhead.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In
Section II, we discuss related works in Sybil defense. In
Section III, we provide an overview of our approach, followed
by the design details of SybilControl in Section IV. Section
V documents the deployment of SybilControl, specifically for
DHTs. The performance and effectiveness of SybilControl is
evaluated in Section VI, followed by concluding remarks in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
After the initial classification of the Sybil attack [8], several
centralized Sybil defense schemes [4], [15] were proposed
that focused on using a central authority to certify nodes for
admission control and limit the number of Sybil identities.
However, the centralized nature of these schemes conflict with
many of the guiding principles of distributed systems, and a
central authority creates trust issues, a single point of failure,
and possible performance bottlenecks.
In an alternate direction, several proposals have focused
on decentralized schemes that work better in conjunction
with distributed systems. One approach [5] is to utilize the
bootstrap graph of DHTs. The idea is that a small number
of malicious users would introduce, or bootstrap, many Sybil
nodes into the system, so the bootstrap graph for these nodes
would be highly connected. However, it is possible that honest
nodes might also bootstrap many other honest nodes, making
it difficult to accurately distinguish honest from malicious
users. A distributed registration system was introduced in [7]
that regulated the number of identities a specific IP address
could obtain. However, it is possible for adversaries to control
multiple IP addresses through spoofing or prefix hijacking
attacks. Additionally, multiple honest users could share the
same IP address if they are behind a NAT, which makes this
approach less practical.
The most recent schemes have focused on exploiting social
network information [6], [11], [21], [22]. SybilGuard, its
successor SybilLimit, and Whanau [11], [21], [22] provide
protocols to defend against Sybil attacks, based on random
walks over a social network. SybilInfer [6] uses Bayesian in-
ference based on information gathered from the social network
to distinguish between malicious and honest nodes. However,
all of these defenses assume that social networks are “fast-
mixing”, which a recent study [13] has shown is not true
in real-world networks to the extent these schemes assume.
This leaves open questions about the strengths of the security
guarantees these mechanisms provide and their true real-world
effectiveness. Furthermore, use of social networks may not be
appropriate in all systems since nodes must then be aware of
their social contacts. Also, social relationships require manual
effort on the part of human users to instrument and correctly
maintain.
The concept of using computational puzzles for Sybil de-
fense is not unique to SybilControl. A related approach by
Borisov [2] also discussed challenge distribution and puzzle
solving verification in overlay networks, and inspired several
key techniques at the core of our scheme. However, the
work provided only a conceptual description, without any
implementation, analysis or evaluation on effectiveness. It did
not investigate necessary modifications to existing distributed
system protocols to maintain system performance under the
scheme. The scheme also had several flaws in its design,
and was incomplete in that it did not handle misbehaving
nodes that do not solve puzzles. Furthermore, node capacity
heterogeneity, a common argument against the practical use
of computational puzzle, was not dealt with. SybilControl
addresses all these short-comings.
III. OVERVIEW
The goal of SybilControl (or other Sybil prevention
schemes) is not to completely prevent adversaries from joining
the system, but rather to place a limit on the number of
additional Sybil nodes adversaries can join, thereby preventing
them from obtaining significant influence over the system.
SybilControl operates towards this goal using the following
insight: if a computational cost is incurred by nodes before
they are allowed to join the system, then adversaries with finite
resources will have an upper bound on the rate they can acquire
identities. Moreover, if nodes are required to periodically repay
this computational cost to retain their identifiers, then the
number of identifiers that can be maintained by the adversary
will be limited.
To leverage this insight, SybilControl controls admission
and retainment of nodes into a system. To do this, SybilCon-
trol provides a distributed enforcement mechanism to allow
network participants to collectively verify that their neighbors
are paying computational costs (through the use of puzzles)
to remain in the system. In particular, SybilControl provides
mechanisms to address two key challenges:
Fig. 1. SybilControl-enabled nodes require proof-of-work when accepting
services.
A. Collectively verifying a node:
In a distributed system, we lack a centralized authority to
verify puzzle solutions of new arrivals. To address this, Sybil-
Control allows decentralized groups of nodes to collectively
verify the computational work done by their neighbors. For
example in Figure 1, before a node A trusts communication
with another node B, A requires B to prove that it recently
solved a puzzle. If B is a malicious Sybil node and chooses
not to solve the puzzles, it will not be able to provide
proof-of-work. Defense mechanisms in SybilControl protect
honest nodes like A from using B, essentially making B non-
functional in the system and preventing it from doing harm.
This forces adversaries to use only puzzle-solving Sybils, of
which they can support a limited number.
To establish recurring proof-of-work, SybilControl uses a
distributed collective verification scheme, where nodes periodi-
cally challenge each other to solve new puzzles. Following this
scheme, if a group of nodes B1, B2, and B3 collectively desire
to communicate with another node A, they each periodically
create, record, and send new challenges to A, as in Figure
2(a). A also periodically creates a new challenge using the
latest received challenges, as in Figure 2(b), and uses that
new challenge to solve a new puzzle, as shown in Figure 2(c).
When any one of the nodes requests a service from A, for
example node B1, A responds with the service as well as
information from the latest puzzle it solved. If B1 still has
recorded the original challenge used in the puzzle, B1 can
verify A’s puzzle solution. The duration for which B1 records
challenges can put a bound on how recent A’s solution is,
validating its timeliness. If all nodes in the network formed a
single group and collectively challenged each other, then all
pairs of nodes can perform direct verification.
B. Verifying across multiple hops:
Performing direct verification between all pairs of nodes
in the network can be prohibitively expensive. While it may
scale to systems that communicate in a full mesh (e.g., one-
hop overlay networks), many systems restrict the number of
neighbors a node is allowed to communicate with for scaling
purposes (e.g., in DHTs like Chord, nodes maintain regular
communication relationships with only a logarithmic number
of adjacent neighbors). To support these systems, SybilControl
provides a multi-hop verification scheme.
To do this, nodes in SybilControl only exchange challenges
with their neighbors. Neighbor relationships may be selected
arbitrarily, or in a manner based on the instrumented dis-
tributed system (e.g., when applying SybilControl to the Chord
DHT, challenges may be exchanged only with a node’s fingers
and successors). Each node, as in Figure 2(b), then performs
a cryptographic aggregation step to combine the challenges
received by its neighbors, and uses this aggregation as input
to construct its own challenges to be sent to its neighbors. This
process repeats, allowing a node’s challenge to be distributed
throughout the network. SybilControl provides a multi-hop
verification mechanism, allowing a node to check whether its
challenge is indirectly incorporated by a remote node. This
allows indirect proof-of-work to be established between a node
and non-neighbors.
IV. SYBILCONTROL DESIGN
In this section, we discuss the details of SybilControl’s
design. SybilControl limits the extent of Sybil attacks by
enforcing that nodes in the system perform periodic computa-
tional work to remain in the system. SybilControl achieves this
using two parts: a collective verification scheme and protection
mechanisms. The collective verification scheme establishes an
environment where nodes can collectively verify the computa-
tional work of other nodes. The protection mechanisms utilize
this verification environment to allow honest nodes to protect
themselves from Sybil nodes. These mechanisms eliminate the
threat of Sybil nodes that do not solve puzzles. This forces
adversaries to use only verifiable Sybils, of which they can
only support a limited number. Section IV-A describes the
collective verification scheme, while Section IV-B details the
protection mechanisms.
A. Collective Verification Scheme
The collective verification scheme of SybilControl allows
nodes to challenge one another to solve computational puzzles
and to collectively verify the completion of the work. This cre-
ates an environment where honest nodes can detect and avoid
contact with misbehaving nodes that do not perform work.
Section IV-A1 discusses the distribution of puzzle challenges,
while Section IV-A2 illustrates the process of solving puzzles
and directly verifying neighbors. Multi-hop verification is used
to verify non-neighbor nodes, as described in Section IV-A3.
1) Distributing Challenges: SybilControl-enabled nodes
must efficiently distribute numerical challenges to other nodes
that are used in solving puzzles. Since in most distributed
systems, nodes regularly ping their neighbors to ensure avail-
ability, these ping messages provide a convenient medium for
carrying challenges. We use a modified ping message that
additionally includes the challenge. This results in challenge
distribution only directly to neighbors, an efficient method
which scales with the underlying system and requires little
overhead.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Overview of SybilControl. (a) Node A maintains a puzzle solution sA−old and its associated challenge cA−old. Node A receives challenges c
from other nodes B1, B2, and B3, which (b) are used along with node A’s old challenge to periodically compute a new challenge cA−new . (c) Node A
periodically generates a fresh puzzle solution based on its new challenge.
The difficulty with this method is propagating a challenge
throughout the network while communicating with only neigh-
bors. To overcome this, a node’s new challenge is computed
periodically based off a hash of the node’s latest distributed
challenge, the latest received challenges, and the identifiers
for the nodes that sent those challenges, as in Figure 2(b). Let
node A be the neighbor of m nodes B1,...,Bm. If the latest
challenges A has received from those nodes are cB1 ,...,cBm ,
then A computes a new challenge of:
cAnew=H(B1||cB1 ||...||Bm||cBm ||cAold)
where || represents concatenation and H() can be a secure
hash function such as SHA-2 [14]. Since new challenges
are constructed using a cryptographic aggregation of received
challenges, challenges are indirectly propagated throughout
the network without direct all-to-all distribution. When A
distributes cAnew , A’s neighbors will receive a challenge that
indirectly includes the challenges of B1,...,Bm.
Each time a new challenge is computed, the data associated
with its construction must be maintained for a period of time.
This allows future verification of puzzles that use the new
challenge. The newly computed challenge and the previously
computed challenge are stored, along with a table of the
associated received challenges, referred to as the state records.
So when cAnew is computed, it is recorded with cAold and the
state record mapping Bi to cBi for i in [1,m].
The duration for which this data is maintained depends
on the length of time it takes a challenge to propagate a
network and be a viable candidate for puzzle solving. If each
node sends out pings every p seconds and the network has
diameter d, then assuming p seconds is longer than network
latency, it takes at most pd seconds for a challenge to indirectly
propagate across the network. Note that in efficient overlay
networks, d = O(lgN). Additionally, if a node A just received
a challenge from node B, it will receive another challenge
from B within 2p: at most p seconds before B sends a new
ping and at most p seconds before the ping message arrives.
So if A doesn’t solve a puzzle within 2p, the challenge it just
received from B will not be used to solve a puzzle. Using this
insight, the maximum time it could take a challenge used for
a puzzle to propagate the diameter of a network is p(d+2). If
a puzzle is solved every s seconds, a node’s puzzle could be
based on a specific challenge for a total of 2s: s seconds for
solving the puzzle with that challenge and another s seconds
before a new puzzle is solved, replacing the need to record
that old challenge. Therefore, records should be maintained
for 2s+ p(d+ 2) seconds.
2) Solving Puzzles and Directly Verifying Neighbors:
SybilControl-enabled nodes must solve puzzles periodically. A
node uses the latest computed challenge to solve the puzzles,
which implies the puzzle solutions are dependent on received
challenges. Ideally, the challenge used to solve a new puzzle
should be fresh, meaning it was computed from newly received
(directly and indirectly) challenges. Since it takes at most
pd seconds (see Section IV-A1) for a challenge to indirectly
propagate across a network, a reasonable time interval s for
solving puzzles would be at least pd seconds. Note that s does
have a lower bound in that the slowest user in the system has
to be able to solve at least one puzzle in s seconds.
Whenever a node solves a puzzle, it records the puzzle state,
which is data to verify the correctness and freshness of the
puzzle solution. This includes the puzzle solution, the puzzle
challenge, and that challenge’s state record. To provide puzzle
verification, nodes provide their latest puzzle state. Note that
only the latest puzzle state is necessary for correctness because
even nodes across the diameter of the network will have on
record their challenges that indirectly were used to create the
challenge used for the puzzle solution (see Section IV-A1).
Say node A contacted its neighbor B during a system
operation, such as a DHT lookup. In addition to replying
to the lookup query, B responds with its latest puzzle state.
The verifying node A can validate the freshness of the puzzle
solution by confirming that its own challenge stored in the
received state record is still on record. This guarantees that
B’s puzzle was solved within the last 2s+ p(d+ 2) seconds.
Using the remaining puzzle state data, A can compute and use
the puzzle challenge to authenticate B’s puzzle solution. If any
step in the validation fails, A can assume B is misbehaving
and refuse B’s service, inhibiting B’s negative influence.
3) Verifying Non-Neighbors along a Path: Neighbors-only
challenge distribution prevents direct non-neighbor verifica-
tion. However, non-neighbors can still be indirectly verified
through multi-hop verification. During multi-hop verification,
a node iteratively verifies other nodes along a path through
a neighbor. This path could be a DHT lookup or routing
path. The process of verifying puzzles at a specific node in
the path is the same as described in Section IV-A2, however,
additional information is communicated and used during path
verification.
As described in Section IV-A2, when node A verifies node
B, B responds with its puzzle state. However, when verifying
a path, B additionally sends its recorded challenges and their
associated state tables. This allows A to verify the correctness
of any one of B’s recorded challenges by checking that the
challenge from A stored in the associated state table is still
on A’s record, and recomputing the challenge to ensure it
matches B’s challenge. Using this method, A should be able
to verify the correctness of most, although possibly not the
tail-end (oldest challenges), of B’s record.
A temporarily stores the verified portion of B’s record for
the next verification. The following node C in the path should
be a neighbor of B, and C’s puzzles and challenges should
be computed based on challenges from B. A can now contact
and verify C’s puzzle state and challenge records using the
temporarily stored B records, instead of A’s own records. If
C is verified, A can again verify a portion of C’s record, then
replaces its temporary records for B with the verified portion
of C’s records. In this manner, A can iteratively continue to
verify all nodes along a path, providing indirect verification
of any node in the network.
B. Protection Mechanisms
Section IV-A describes a scheme that creates an environ-
ment where nodes can verify computational work of other
nodes. This section discusses mechanisms that protect honest
nodes from the forms of Sybil attack that can occur in that
environment. There are three general strategies for a Sybil
attack.
The first strategy for a Sybil attack is to use consistently
unverifiable Sybil nodes. These Sybils never perform compu-
tational work, allowing an adversary to support a large scale
attack. Section IV-B1 details complete protection from this
attack strategy, regardless of the scale of attack. The second
attack method is using initially verifiable Sybil nodes, which
bypass the defense in Section IV-B1. After incorporation into
the network, these Sybils halt computational work so an
adversary can attempt to join and support even more malicious
nodes. Section IV-B2 provides simple mechanisms that control
the influence from such an attack. The mechanisms described
in these two sections inhibit the influence of unverifiable
nodes, which would force adversaries to use consistently
verifiable Sybils, the final form of a Sybil attack. These Sybils
correctly follow the collective verification scheme, making
them indistinguishable from honest nodes, but may misbehave
otherwise. However, an adversary with limited resources can
only support a restricted number of verifiable Sybils, reducing
their malicious influence. Section IV-B3 provides a mechanism
that leverages heterogeneity in node computational capacities
for further minimizing the impact of this attack form.
1) Protecting against Consistently Unverifiable Sybils:
With the collective verification scheme, nodes can distinguish
those who perform computational work from those who do
not, allowing controlled communication with only behaving
nodes. However, some system operations sensitive to net-
work dynamics, particularly churn-handling protocols, may
benefit from temporarily accepting unverified nodes for faster
convergence. Maintaining this benefit may permit a large
number of consistently unverifiable Sybils to hijack neighbor
relationships through churn-handling.
To remedy this adversarial situation, SybilControl-enable
nodes use a delayed-adding mechanism, where nodes only
establish neighbor relationships upon computational work ver-
ification. Thus, a Sybil that never solves a puzzle will never
be considered a neighbor of any nodes, and will have no
influence. With the delayed-adding mechanism, nodes newly
discovered through churn-handling are temporarily managed
in an untrusted list. Challenges are distributed to both es-
tablished neighbors and nodes in the untrusted list. Once an
untrusted node should become verifiable, a direct verification
is conducted, and only upon success does that node become
an established neighbor.
This mechanism provides complete protection from con-
sistently unverifiable Sybil nodes in that those nodes will
never hijack neighbor relationships. Furthermore, newly dis-
covered honest nodes are not immediately verifiable anyway,
and should not be considered viable neighbors. However,
churn-handling protocols often rely on distributing information
about neighbor relationships, meaning newly discovered nodes
would not be included in churn-handling until verification.
This can degrade churn-handling performance, which may not
be acceptable to systems sensitive to churn.
To maintain efficient protocol performance, churn-handling
protocols include nodes in the untrusted list. If churn-handling
protocols are utilizing information about the i-th neighbor,
and there is a node in the untrusted list that should soon
replace that neighbor relationship, then the protocol distributes
information on the untrusted node. This allows churn-handling
protocols to maintain convergence times by operating as if
the newly discovered node was immediately established as
a neighbor. Note that this does not reduce the protection of
the delayed-adding mechanisms, as a consistently unverifiable
node will remain only in the untrusted lists of nodes dur-
ing churn-handling. Therefore, consistently unverifiable Sybil
nodes simply cannot obtain positions to maliciously influence
the system.
2) Protecting against Initially Verifiable Sybils: The mech-
anism in section IV-B1 removes the threat of consistently
unverifiable Sybils. However, a malicious node can bypass the
defense by initially performing work until it is no longer in the
untrusted list, and has become an established neighbor. The
adversary, now no longer paying a computational cost, may
attempt to join more nodes. This vulnerability arises because
nodes are validated in the collective verification scheme only
upon contact, which may be infrequent.
To provide nodes with protection from this attack, two
mechanisms are introduced. The first mechanism is the backup
neighbors list. When churn-handling with the delayed-adding
mechanisms replaces an old neighbor relationship with a
new neighbor, the old neighbor is still maintained in the
backup neighbors list if it is currently safe. A node can be
determined safe by simply conducting a direct verification.
This backup list serves as a level of redundancy should the pri-
mary neighbors become overrun with initially verifiable Sybils.
Eventually, these Sybil will be detected and removed from
the primary neighbors, which can be repopulated using both
churn-handling and backup neighbors. Note that challenges
must still be sent to nodes in the backup table because they
may be contacted should a primary neighbor fail.
To ensure that a node’s neighbors do not go unverified for
long periods of time, the second defense mechanism is simple:
periodic neighbor verification. Neighbor and backup neighbors
can be periodically verified, much like neighbor relationships
are periodically updated with churn-handling protocols. If
any neighbors fail verification, they can be replaced with a
new node through using churn-handling or the backup list.
Thus, adversaries can enter only a limited number of initially
verifiable Sybils, since Sybils no longer performing work will
be soon removed from all neighbor relationships and become
uninfluential.
Ideally, neighbor relationships would be verified every puz-
zle time s, to ensure all neighbors are consistently perform-
ing work. However, the main purpose of periodic neighbor
verification is to ensure that at least a subset of a node’s
neighbors is still fully verifiable and can be used for system
operations. Then, verifying a fraction of neighbors every s
seconds can still be effective if the portion is large enough
such that the node can still function if the non-verified portion
was composed of unverified nodes. We leave it to specific
applications to determine the most appropriate frequency of
this periodic table verification.
If an adversary has large amounts of computational re-
sources, it could support enough initially verifiable Sybils to
fill up both the primary and backup neighbor list of some
nodes. SybilControl cannot prevent this from occurring and
does not offer guaranteed protection. However, use of addi-
tional backup lists can provide more protection. Furthermore,
Section IV-B3 discusses a mechanism that can reduce the
initial influence of these initially verifiable Sybils, which may
further reduce this threat.
3) Leveraging Heterogeneity to Protect Against Consis-
tently Verifiable Sybils: The final strategy of a Sybil attacker
is to attempt to support consistently verifiable Sybil nodes.
These nodes are indistinguishable from honest nodes because
they follow the collective verification scheme correctly, but
may misbehave otherwise. While SybilControl cannot prevent
these “invisible” Sybils from doing any harm, it can provide
a mechanism that reduces the total influence these Sybils may
have. The mechanism is virtual node usage, which leverages
heterogeneity in node computational capacities.
Computational puzzle schemes tend to suffer from the
heterogeneity of node capacities in a system. However, this
heterogeneity is leveraged by SybilControl for improved Sybil
protection. Puzzles must require a maximum amount of com-
putational resources that should be manageable by nodes
with less capacity. However, many honest nodes will have
significantly more computational power than that maximum.
Virtual node usage is a mechanism where honest users are
allowed to optionally control extra virtual nodes if they have
the resources to support them. With more honest nodes, a
larger fraction of the network is controlled by honest users,
and Sybil attacks would have less influence. Note that it is
inconsequential that we cannot distinguish honest from mali-
cious users when assigning virtual nodes because a malicious
user would support extra Sybil nodes regardless.
To provide some intuition as to the benefits of using virtual
nodes, assume we have an n node DHT network. On average,
each node controls 1
n
of the keyspace. If an adversary can
join a maximum of m Sybil nodes into the system, the
adversary can control on average m
n+m
of the keyspace. If
the average honest user has enough computational resources
to maintain work for q nodes, then by allowing users to
support q virtual nodes, the m-node Sybil attack will now
only influence an average of m
q∗n+m
of the keyspace, which
can be a significantly smaller portion. This illustration shows
that use of virtual nodes can protect more of the keyspace
and reduce the influences of Sybil nodes that an adversary
can support. In addition, the number of these Sybils should
already be limited by the collective verification scheme and
the mechanisms in Section IV-B1 and IV-B2, which prevent
unverified nodes from being a significant threat.
V. A SYBILCONTROL-ENABLED DHT
SybilControl creates a unique environment for distributed
systems since nodes may or may not be verifiable. In this
section, we discuss practical issues associated with the de-
ployment of SybilControl. To provide concrete examples of
techniques, we describe SybilControl in the context of DHTs.
Many distributed systems, such as distributed file systems,
distributed databases, and peer-to-peer networks, rely on a
DHT as an underlying structure for storage or routing. While
we describe this section in the context of DHTs for clarity,
the general principles should be applicable to most other
distributed systems.
In Section V-A, we discuss several practical issues in-
troduced by deploying SybilControl. The techniques for a
practical SybilControl-enabled DHT involve resilient lookup
protocols described in Section V-B, and replication mecha-
nisms as described in Section V-C.
A. Issues with Deploying SybilControl
In a SybilControl-enabled system, nodes may not immedi-
ately trust communications with certain other nodes, such as
newly joined nodes or un-established neighbors. SybilControl
uses the delayed-adding mechanism, detailed in Section IV-B1,
to handle these untrusted nodes and include them in churn-
handling protocols. While information about these changing
neighbor relationships are propagated throughout the network,
they do not manifested into new viable neighbors until the
untrusted nodes provide proof of computational work, which
requires some time for puzzle completion. This delay between
when a new relationship is discovered and when it becomes vi-
able can result in increased sensitivity to churn in SybilControl-
enabled systems.
For example, in a DHT such as Chord, a newly joined node
A immediately gains control over a portion of keyspace that
previously was supported by its immediate successor B. In a
SybilControl-enabled DHT, the delayed-adding mechanism of
B prevents it from immediately transferring control to A as
it has not been established as a verifiable neighbor yet. This
is desirable for Sybil defense since the newly joined node
could be an unverified Sybil. However, B could fail before
A becomes verifiable, and all data B may be lost, including
those that would have been transferred to A. This possible
scenario, among many others, is created by the SybilControl
environment, and must be handled to avoid system perfor-
mance degradation.
B. Resilient Lookup Protocols
The primary DHT operation is the lookup for a key, where
a node determines the path to the objects or nodes associated
with that key. To prevent lookup performance degradation, a
SybilControl-enabled DHT can use resilient lookup protocols.
These resilient lookups not only improve lookup performance
with SybilControl, but are generally used to provide resilience
against Sybil attacks. Many DHTs already support resilient
lookups, so use of this technique does not require extensive
modifications to existing DHTs.
Since SybilControl requires iterative path verification, multi-
hop lookups in SybilControl systems must be iterative. To im-
prove lookup resilience, backtracking and redundant lookups
can be used. With backtracking lookups, the lookup initia-
tor maintains a history of contacted nodes, and backtrack
to the last contacted verifiable node when encountering a
failed or unverified node. This results in lookups resilient to
node failures or unresponsive Sybils. Lookup query messages
can additionally carry the list of contacted nodes, including
failed nodes. This provides a heuristic for nodes responding
to lookup queries to ignore already-contacted nodes when
determining the next hop in the lookup path. DHT lookups
are designed to provide the best next-hop suggestion, and
revisiting nodes would result in less-than-optimal cycles.
With redundant lookups, multiple backtracking lookups
should be conducted for the same key while sharing a common
list of contacted nodes. This can result in multiple unique
lookup paths. In the face of Sybil attacks or failed nodes,
redundant lookups are more resilient because they fail only if
all lookups contact Sybil or failed nodes, which is less likely
with a larger number of redundant lookups.
C. Replications
In DHTs, the failure of a node maintaining some data can
result in the loss of that data. A standard idea to improving
DHT robustness, which applies also when enabling SybilCon-
trol, is to replicate, by storing additional copies of that data.
With object-storage DHTs, where nodes maintain some data
or files such as in a distributed file system, several replications
can be supported by different nodes. Even if one node fails or
is misbehaving, several other replicas are accessible. In routing
DHTs, nodes hold pointers or addresses to other nodes to be
used for routing. With replications, several nodes maintain the
same pointers or addresses, instead of only one. Similar work
has been done with the i3 Internet Indirection Infrastructure
system [16].
Replications can be maintained locally with respect to iden-
tifiers. With local replications, a node and several consecutive
predecessors and/or successors can maintain redundant copies.
It is less likely that these nodes will all simultaneously fail
or be subverted by an adversary. However, the system is most
robust if non-local nodes also support redundant copies. This
prevents a targeted attack or a local network failure to a
specific area of the identifier space to result in lost access to
all data. The details of this are more specific to the underlying
system, and are beyond the scope of our discussion.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance overhead of
enabling SybilControl in a DHT and the ability of SybilCon-
trol to protect the DHT from attack. We investigated these
properties using our own simulator of the Chord DHT. We
chose Chord for its simplicity and scalability. The simulator
directly implements standard Chord protocols as well as the
protocols and mechanisms described in Section IV and Section
V.
To allow for consistent comparisons, the simulations fol-
lowed the same network dynamics. Initially, the network
consisted of 1000 verifiable nodes. Nodes sent ping messages
carrying challenges every 5 seconds. We use a puzzle time of
20 seconds, which is based off our suggestion for a puzzle time
larger than pd in Section IV-A1. We model churn similarly to
other studies [10], with a pareto distribution for mean session
time and an exponential distribution for mean downtime.
Since the same studies indicate that the mean session time
is typically more than 60 minutes, we used 60 minutes as our
distribution means.
Chord uses two churn-handling protocols: fix-fingers and
stabilize. In the original Chord evaluation [17], the frequency
f of each protocol execution is in a range between every 15
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Fig. 3. Lookup performance of regular Chord and SybilControl using different number of replications versus f , the frequency of churn-handling. (a) shows
average lookup success rates, while (b) graphs the lookup hops.
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Fig. 4. Lookup performance of SybilControl using different number of replications when varying percentages of Sybil nodes in the network. (a) shows
average lookup success rates, while (b) graphs the lookup hops.
seconds to every 45 seconds. We use values of f also within
that range. Each simulation is ran for 10000 seconds before
measurements, to avoid cold-start effects.
A. Performance Overhead of SybilControl Deployment
This section investigates the performance overhead of en-
abling SybilControl in the Chord DHT. The primary operation
in Chord is a lookup, so we evaluated lookup performance
metrics for Chord with and without SybilControl enabled.
Each alive node in the network attempted 10 resilient lookups
for random keys. We measured the success rate of attempted
lookups and the number of hops in a successful lookup’s path,
which we define as the number of nodes contacted, includ-
ing failed nodes. To accurately measure only performance
overhead, the network excluded any misbehaving nodes. f ,
Chord’s fix-finger and stabilize time interval, is varied between
every 15, 30, and 45 seconds. Since a smaller f implies
more frequent churn-handling, we expect that f is negatively
correlated with lookup performance.
Since SybilControl systems must additionally deal with
node verifiability, it would not be surprising if SybilControl
reduced performance. However, the techniques in Section
V should address these issues and improve performance.
In particular, using multiple replication in SybilControl is
expected to help improve performance. With more replicas,
SybilControl lookups should be more likely to succeed in
finding an alive, verifiable node that holds a copy. SybilControl
was evaluated using 0, 1, and 2 replication.
Figure 3 shows the lookup performance measurements for
SybilControl-enabled Chord using varying number of replica-
tions and regular Chord. Figure 3(a) plots the success rate of
lookups versus f . As expected, regular Chord outperformed
SybilControl without replications, with lookup success rate
about 1% higher for regular Chord. However, even when
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Fig. 5. Lookup success rates of SybilControl without virtual nodes and SybilControl where honest users support an average of 2 virtual nodes, while varying
percentages of the initial network are Sybil nodes.
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Fig. 6. Lookup hop counts of SybilControl without virtual nodes and SybilControl where honest users support an average of 2 virtual nodes, while varying
percentages of the initial network are Sybil nodes.
one extra replication was used, SybilControl’s performance
improves significantly and is better than regular Chord. At
two replications, average lookup success rate is consistently
near 100%. The effect of varying f also generally matched
expectation. Lookup success rates for regular Chord and no-
replication SybilControl decline with larger f , by as much as
2%. One-replication SybilControl seems to also be affected
to a lesser degree. Performance with two replications seems
unaffected by f .
Figure 3(b) plots the lookup hops versus f . Again, no-
replication SybilControl performs worse than regular Chord,
typically by approximately 0.3 hops. However, once one
replication is introduced, SybilControl lookups roughly match
regular Chord lookups in hop count, varying by less than 0.1
hops. Additional replications only give diminishing improve-
ments. The effect of f is more apparent in this graph. Increase
in f results in an increase in the average number of contacted
nodes for both regular Chord and SybilControl. Increased
numbers of replications do not seem to show a resistance to
differences in f as they do with lookup success rate.
B. SybilControl-Enabled DHT Under Attack
In this section, we look into performance of a SybilControl-
enabled DHT when an adversary is performing a Sybil attack.
SybilControl limits the number of Sybil nodes an adversary
can support but it does not provide strict bounds on that
number. For our evaluations, we assume the adversary has
enough computational resources to support up to 20% of the
nodes in the initial 1000 node network. Note that this may
represent scenarios worse than what is likely to occur in a
real-world SybilControl systems.
We use the same performance metrics as described in
Section VI-A. f is set at every 30 seconds for all simulations.
For this evaluation, we assume Sybil nodes drop any lookup
queries. Simulating more complex behavior would wander
into the realm of other attacks, which may be dealt with
in other works. For resilient lookup protocols, nodes first
perform one lookup with a time-to-live of 30 hops, and upon
failure, perform two simultaneous redundant lookups. Also,
we do not draw comparisons with regular Chord because it
was not designed to withstand Sybil attacks. Again, we tested
SybilControl using 0, 1, and 2 replications. To study the effect
of including virtual nodes, we also tested SybilControl where
each honest user could support an average of 2 virtual nodes.
With additional replications, we expected that Sybil resis-
tance would improve. More replications increase the chance
that an honest, verifiable node hold a replica. Also, use of
virtual nodes is expected to also improve Sybil resistance. With
more virtual nodes, each Sybil node should claim a smaller
portion of the key space, limiting the total influence of an
adversary.
1) Results using Replications: Figure 4 graphs the lookup
performance metric for SybilControl using different number
of replications, when under varying strength Sybil attacks.
Figure 4(a) plots the SybilControl lookup success rate versus
percentage of Sybil nodes in the network. As expected, the use
of replication is beneficial. No-replication SybilControl was
significantly affected by Sybil attacks, with lookup success rate
almost 20% lower when the Sybil nodes made up 20% of the
network. Using even a single replication dramatically reduced
this drop-off. Single replication saw a lookup success rate drop-
off of about 4% under the same powered attack. SybilControl
using two replications appears to be almost unaffected by Sybil
nodes, retaining above 99% success rate.
Figure 4(b) plots the lookup hops versus percentage of
Sybil nodes in the network. Again, no-replication SybilControl
performed poorly, resulting in more than a three-fold increase
in lookup hops when under large Sybil attacks. Use of replica-
tion significantly reduces this increase, but is not completely
resistant against Sybils. Single replication SybilControl under
a Sybil attack composing of 20% of the network still experi-
ences a two-fold increase in lookup hops. While the benefit of
each additional replication still diminishes, it does not appear
to diminish as fast as when free of Sybil influence. Again
under the 20% network Sybil attack, switching from one to
two replications decreased lookup hops by 1.3 nodes, while
switching from no to one replication lowered the lookup hops
by 4.1 nodes. Using even more than two replications may lead
to further increases in Sybil resistance.
2) Results using Virtual Nodes: Figure 5 depicts the lookup
success rate of SybilControl systems under Sybil attack, where
the average honest user supports 2 virtual nodes. In each graph,
a different number of replications were used. As predicted,
use of virtual nodes improved lookup success in general.
However, virtual nodes were most effective when using fewer
replications. When Sybils controlled 20% of the initial network
(before virtual node usage), use of virtual nodes improved no-
replication SybilControl lookup success rate by about 10%,
while two-replication SybilControl only improved by less than
1%. This is expect since using large number of replications
already improves success rate to near 100%, so there is little
room for improvements from virtual nodes.
Figure 6 depicts the number of nodes contacted during
SybilControl lookups using virtual nodes and under Sybil
attack. As seen with lookup success rate, virtual nodes help
decrease the number of nodes contacted, and the benefits are
most apparent with fewer replications. With no-replication
SybilControl, virtual node usage decreases the lookup hop
count by about 3 nodes when 20% of the initial network is
Sybils. Under the same attack, two-replication SybilControl
saw only a decrease of 0.4 in the average number of con-
tacted nodes, which is approximately a 10% improvement.
An interesting observation is that virtual nodes do not seem
to benefit much at all under smaller Sybil attacks, where the
number of Sybils is less than 5% of the initial network. This
isn’t unexpected though, given that the use of virtual nodes
decreases the influence of each Sybil node slightly, and with
few Sybil nodes, the total improvement is less noticeable.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented SybilControl, a novel, decentralized
scheme for controlling the extent of Sybil attacks. SybilControl
consists of a distributed protocol to allow nodes to collectively
verify computational work of their neighbors and defense
mechanisms to enforce that nodes conduct computational
work to stay functional in the system. Thus, adversaries with
finite amount of computational resources will be only able to
support a limited number of Sybil nodes. To demonstrate the
practicality of SybilControl, it was deployed in the context
of DHTs with the aid of existing DHT functionalities. The
performance overhead when enabling SybilControl was shown
to be manageable. Furthermore, a SybilControl-enabled DHT
was shown to be resilient against large-scale Sybil attacks,
capable of maintaining above 99% lookup success rate using
low communication overhead.
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